State of Utah v. Kevin Gurr : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1994
State of Utah v. Kevin Gurr : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Thomas B. Brunker; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; James Taylor;
Deputy Utah County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Michael J. Petro; Young & Kessler; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Gurr, No. 940657 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1994).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/6278
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940657-CA 
v. : 
KEVIN GURR, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (1994), AND FOR POSSESSION OF A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED PERSON, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF § 76-10-
503 (Supp. 1994), IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING 
PRESIDING. 
UTAH CC 
U 
D 
K 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. 9L/^(oh7 
THOMAS B. BRUNKER (4804) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
MICHAEL J. PETRO 
Young & Kessler 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAMES TAYLOR 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center #2100 
Provo, Utah 84720 
Attorneys for Appellee 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED FILED 
APR 1^1995 
• T OF APPEMM 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
Case No. 940657-CA 
KEVIN GURR, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OF A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (1994), AND FOR POSSESSION OF A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED PERSON, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF § 76-10-
503 (Supp. 1994), IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE RAY M. HARDING 
PRESIDING. 
THOMAS B. BRUNKER (4804) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
MICHAEL J. PETRO 
Young & Kessler 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Attorneys for Appellant 
JAMES TAYLOR 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center #2100 
Provo, Utah 84720 
Attorneys for Appellee 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW . . 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED ONE 
OR BOTH OF THE FIREARMS FOUND IN THE 
TRAILER HE USED AS HIS RESIDENCE . . . . 6 
POINT II DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BURGLARY CONVICTION 
MET THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF A 
CRIME OF VIOLENCE; THEREFORE, DEFENDANT 
WAS A RESTRICTED PERSON PRECLUDED FROM 
POSSESSING A FIREARM 9 
POINT III EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED 
MARIJUANA IN STREET-SALE-SIZED PACKAGES, 
AND THAT HE HAD OTHER ITEMS COMMONLY 
USED TO REPACKAGE LARGER QUANTITIES 
INTO STREET-SALE QUANTITIES SUPPORTED 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT DEFENDANT 
POSSESSED MARIJUANA WITH INTENT TO 
DISTRIBUTE IT 10 
CONCLUSION 13 
ADDENDUM A - Statutes 
ADDENDUM B - Findings and Conclusions 
ADDENDUM C - Prior Judgment on Guilty Plea to Burglary 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986) 6, 8, 9 
State v. Binaham. 732 P.2d 132 (Utah 1987) 15 
State v. Constantino. 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1985) 15 
State v. Davis, 711 P.2d at 234 7 
State v. Fox. 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985) 15, 16 
State v. Goodman. 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988) 2, 6, 14 
State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182 (Utah 1985) 15, 16 
State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467 (Utah App. 1991) 7, 14 
State v. Phelps, 782 P.2d 196 (Utah App. 1989) 15, 16 
State v. Reed. 839 P. 2d 878 (Utah App. 1992) 6 
State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313 (Utah App. 1993) 2, 10 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1994) 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1994) 1, 2, 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-103 (1990) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-104 (1990) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990) 10, 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-402 (1990) 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501 (Supp. 1994) 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1994) 1, 3, 6, 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1994) 1 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KEVIN GURR, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 940657-CA 
Priority 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Kevin Gurr appeals his convictions for possession 
of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) (1994), a third 
degree felony, and for possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 1994) (R. 90-91). This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 
1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Does the evidence support the trial court's finding 
that defendant possessed a firearm where police found two 
firearms in a trailer in which only defendant resided? In 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial 
court's verdict, this court "must sustain the trial court's 
judgment unless it is 'against the clear weight of the evidence, 
or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made.'" State v. Goodman. 763 
P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted). 
2. Where the statutory scheme prohibits someone previously 
convicted of any degree of burglary from possessing a firearm, 
does defendant's prior conviction for burglary support his 
conviction for possession of a firearm by a restricted person 
even though the sentencing court lowered the burglary to a class 
A misdemeanor? Defendant's appellate argument challenges the 
trial court's statutory interpretation; therefore, this Court 
reviews the trial court's decision for correctness, according it 
no deference. See, e.g., State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 
(Utah App. 1993). 
3. Does the evidence support the trial court's finding 
that defendant possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute 
where he had materials commonly used to repackage larger amounts 
of marijuana into smaller packages for street sale as well as 
packages of marijuana of the size commonly used for street sale? 
See standard of review for issue number one. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Addendum A contains the text of the relevant constitutional 
provisions, statutes, and rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By amended information, the State charged defendant with the 
following: 1) possession of a controlled substance in a drug free 
zone with intent to distribute, a second degree felony, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) & (5) (1994); 2) possession 
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of drug paraphernalia in a drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37a-5 and 58-37-8(5) (1994); and 
3) possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person, a 
third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 
(Supp. 1994). Defendant waived his right to a jury trial (R. 
117-118). The trial court found that the first two offenses did 
not occur in a drug free zone and found defendant guilty of the 
lesser included offenses of possession of a controlled substance 
with the intent to distribute and possession of drug 
paraphernalia (R. 90-91). The trial court also found defendant 
guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person 
(id.). The court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law 
to support the convictions (R. 87-89). Addendum B contains a 
copy of the findings and conclusions. 
By order filed October 19, 1994, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to the statutory indeterminate prison terms of zero to 
five years on the possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of a dangerous weapon charges, and to a term not to 
exceed six months on the possession of paraphernalia charge, with 
all sentences to run concurrently (R. 93-94). The court 
suspended the sentences and granted defendant probation (id.). 
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (R. 112). 
Defendant does not appeal his conviction for possession of drug 
paraphernalia. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 20, 1993, police officers executed a search 
warrant on a trailer (R. 124, 137) . The trailer was located 
behind a business owned by Tom King, a friend of defendant's (R. 
178). Defendant had used the trailer as his residence for two 
years prior to October 1, 1993 (R. 177). On October 1, 1993, 
defendant began spending some nights at his girlfriend's 
apartment and had moved some of his belongings into her 
apartment, but he was still using the trailer as his "home" (R. 
180) . 
At the time the officers executed the warrant, defendant had 
returned to the trailer to spend the night (R. 126-27, 181). The 
officers handcuffed defendant, then searched the ten-by-fourteen-
foot trailer (R. 128-29). The officers discovered six baggies of 
marijuana, finger scales, five one-gallon plastic bags with 
residue that looked and smelled like marijuana, plastic sandwich 
bags, an empty box of plastic sandwich bags, marijuana leaves 
strewn over the table top, a mobile phone, a twelve-gauge 
shotgun, and a .22 caliber rifle (R. 11, 127-28, 130-32, 143-47, 
153-58, 166-68, 171). 
The argument sections below contain additional relevant 
facts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Sufficiency of the evidence; possession of a firearm. 
The evidence supports the trial court's finding that defendant 
possessed the firearms. The police officers found the firearms 
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in the trailer. While others had access to the trailer and used 
it for limited purposes, only defendant used it as his residence. 
Defendant admitted he knew the firearms were in the trailer, but 
no evidence established that any of the other persons with access 
to the trailer, other than Mr. King, knew the shotgun was in the 
trailer, and no evidence established that anyone other than 
defendant knew his father's rifle was in the trailer. Finally, 
defendant testified that the .22 calibre rifle belonged to his 
father, but defendant's father did not have access to the 
trailer. Because defendant had apparently taken the rifle to a 
place where he resided and to which his father did not have 
independent access, the trial court reasonably inferred that 
defendant possessed the rifle within the meaning of the statute. 
2. Defendant's status as a restricted person. Defendant 
previously pleaded guilty to burglary, and the judge granted his 
motion to be sentenced to a class A misdemeanor. Lowering the 
"category" of the burglary meant defendant had a prior conviction 
for class A misdemeanor burglary instead of felony burglary. 
Because the statute precludes anyone previously convicted of any 
degree of burglary from possessing a firearm, the trial court 
correctly concluded defendant was a restricted person. 
3. Sufficiency of the evidence: intent to distribute. 
Defendant claims that the officers caught him with an 
insufficient quantity of marijuana to support an inference that 
he intended to distribute it. Defendant's argument ignores 
testimony that the officers also found materials suggesting that 
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defendant had purchased bulk quantities of marijuana and had 
repackaged it into the smaller quantities commonly used for 
street sale. After taking into account the evidence defendant 
ignores, the record contains sufficient evidence to support his 
conviction for possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute 
it. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT 
DEFENDANT POSSESSED ONE OR BOTH OF THE FIREARMS FOUND 
IN THE TRAILER HE USED AS HIS RESIDENCE 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1) (Supp. 1994) prohibits someone 
convicted of a crime of violence from "possessing" a firearm. In 
order to establish "possession," the evidence must show that 
defendant "'exercised dominion and control' over the weapon, 
'with knowledge of its presence." State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 
1384 (Utah 1986). When police officers searched the trailer, 
they found Mr. King's shotgun and defendant's father's rifle (R. 
11, 145, 189-90). The trial court found that defendant possessed 
the firearms (R. 88); defendant claims the evidence is 
insufficient to support that finding. 
In order to succeed on his sufficiency challenge, defendant 
must establish that the clear weight of the evidence contradicts 
the trial court's finding that he possessed a firearm. State v. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 (Utah 1988). See also State v. 
Reed, 839 P.2d 878, 879 (Utah App. 1992)• Defendant must also 
"'marshal all the evidence supporting the challenged findings and 
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then show that despite that evidence, the findings are clearly 
lacking in support.'" State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah 
App. 1991) (citation omitted). 
Defendant has not marshalled the evidence. Instead, 
defendant focuses on the evidence more supportive of his 
argument, while making only incidental reference to the evidence 
supporting the trial court's finding. See Appellant's Brief at 
16-17. This fails to provide a grounds for reversal. See State 
v. Davis, 711 P.2d at 234 (the defendant's reliance on his 
interpretation of the evidence failed to support his sufficiency 
challenge). 
Moreover, when properly marshalled, the evidence amply 
supports the trial court's finding that defendant possessed the 
firearms.1 The police officers found the firearms in a trailer 
where defendant resided (R. 128, 145-46, 180).2 Although others 
had access to the trailer, they used it for watching television, 
making telephone calls, showering, taking coffee breaks, and 
1
 Although defendant denied ownership of either firearm, 
ownership alone is determinative of possession. State v. Davis, 
711 P.2d at 234 (evidence sufficient to establish possession even 
though another witness claimed ownership of the gun). 
2
 Defendant claims he had moved out of the trailer one week 
prior to his arrest (Appellant's Brief at 17), suggesting he had 
abandoned the trailer as his residence. However, defendant 
admitted that he had not "completely" moved in with his girlfriend, 
and that he was still using the trailer as his home (R. 180) . 
Defendant also admitted that he was the only one of those with 
access to the trailer who slept there, that most of the personal 
items in the trailer belonged to him (R. 194) , and that he was 
checking his messages at the trailer when police arrived to execute 
the search warrant (R. 181). To the extent defendant's argument 
suggests he had abandoned the trailer, his own testimony 
establishes the contrary. 
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doing paperwork (R. 179-80); only defendant lived in the trailer 
and only defendant had his personal belongings in the trailer (R. 
128, 180, 194). Defendant also admitted that he knew the guns 
were in the trailer (R. 193-94); by contrast, no evidence 
established that any of the persons with access to the trailer, 
other than defendant and Mr. King, knew the shotgun was in the 
trailer, and no evidence established that anyone other than 
defendant knew his father's rifle was in the trailer. The 
marshalled evidence supports the trial court's finding that 
defendant exercised possessed the firearms with knowledge of 
their presence. 
Relying on Banks, defendant argues that the evidence is 
insufficient to establish that he possessed the firearms because 
other persons had access to and used the trailer. Appellant's 
Brief at 17-20. In Banks, the Utah Supreme Court found the 
evidence insufficient to support concluding Banks possessed the 
gun found in an apartment in which he, his wife, and a third 
party resided. State v. Banks, 720 P.2d at 1384-85. The Supreme 
Court refused to attribute possession to Banks merely because 
police found the gun in an apartment where two other persons 
resided with Banks and held that the evidence failed to establish 
that Banks "knew the weapon was in the apartment or that he 
exercised any control over it." Id. 
The evidence in this case establishes a much more exclusive 
link between defendant and the firearms. First, defendant admits 
he knew both weapons were in the trailer (R. 194); therefore, the 
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only issue is whether defendant exercised any control over either 
weapon. Defendant kept both weapons in a trailer in which only 
he resided (R. 194), unlike Banks where others also resided in 
the apartment with Banks. Moreover, the evidence that defendant 
"possessed" his father's rifle is especially strong. Defendant 
claimed his father owned the rifle, but defendant's father did 
not have independent access to the trailer (R. 179-80, 190, 203-
204). Because defendant had apparently taken the rifle to a 
place where he resided and to which his father did not have 
independent access, the trial court could reasonably infer that 
defendant "'exercised dominion and control' over the weapon, 
'with knowledge of its presence.'" Id. at 1384. Possession of 
the rifle independently supports defendant's conviction. 
In short, defendant has failed to establish that the clear 
weight of the evidence contradicts the trial court's finding that 
he possessed one or both of the firearms. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BURGLARY CONVICTION MET THE STATUTORY 
DEFINITION OF A CRIME OF VIOLENCE; THEREFORE, DEFENDANT 
WAS A RESTRICTED PERSON PRECLUDED FROM POSSESSING A 
FIREARM 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1) (Supp. 1994) prohibits someone 
previously convicted of a crime of violence from possessing a 
firearm. Section 76-10-501(2) (a) includes burglary as a crime of 
violence without restricting it to any particular category of 
burglary. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-501(2)(a) (Supp. 1994). 
On May 2, 1986, Judge Cullen Christensen entered judgment on 
defendant's guilty plea to one count of burglary. Addendum C 
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contains a copy of the judgement. Judge Christensen granted 
defendant's motion to sentence him to a lower category of the 
offense: a class A misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-4 02 
(1990). However, Judge Christensen's order does not redefine the 
offense to which defendant pleaded as something other than 
burglary. 
Defendant claims that reducing the category of the offense 
to a class A misdemeanor somehow transformed the offense to 
criminal trespass, which the statute does not include as a crime 
of violence. Defendant's argument challenges the trial court's 
interpretation of the controlling statutes; therefore, this Court 
reviews the trial court's decision for correctness, according it 
no deference. See, e.g.. State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1317 
(Utah App. 1993). In construing the relevant statutory terms, 
this Court should construe terms of related code sections 
harmoniously and should give statutory terms their commonly 
accepted meaning unless doing so "results in an application that 
is either 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in blatant 
contradiction of the express purpose of the statute.'" Id. 
(citation omitted). 
The version of Section 76-3-402 in effect when defendant 
pleaded guilty to burglary permitted a trial court to "enter a 
judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1990) 
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(emphasis added) .3 Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-3-103 and 104 (1990) 
define four "categories" of felonies and three "categories" of 
misdemeanors- Reading these statutes together establishes that 
lowering the category of an offense has no affect on its 
substance: a burglary remains a burglary, but becomes a different 
degree of burglary. Therefore, Judge Christensen's judgment 
resulted in defendant's conviction for class A misdemeanor 
burglary. 
Section 76-10-501 defines burglary, regardless of the 
degree, as a crime of violence. Under the statute's plain 
language, defendant's conviction for burglary constituted a crime 
of violence and precluded him from possessing a firearm. Judge 
Christensen's order reducing the category of the burglary to a 
class A misdemeanor did not change that result: defendant still 
pleaded guilty to all of the elements of burglary. 
Defendant's argument assumes without legal support or 
analysis that criminal trespass is the next lower "category" from 
burglary. Appellant's Brief at 24. Although not spelled out, 
defendant's argument assumes that because the burglary statute 
defines burglary as a second or third degree felony, lowering his 
conviction to a class A misdemeanor implies conviction for a 
different substantive crime; defendant settles on criminal 
trespass. 
3
 The legislature has since amended this statute. The 
amended version refers to sentencing a defendant to the next lower 
"degree" of offense. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995). 
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Defendant confuses "category" with "lesser included 
offense." Section 76-3-402 allows the trial court to lower the 
former, it does not permit a trial court to enter judgment on a 
lesser included offense from that for which the defendant was 
convicted or to which the defendant pleaded. In this case, 
defendant pleaded guilty to all of the elements of burglary. 
Exercising his discretion under section 76-3-402, Judge 
Christensen's judgment recorded defendant's conviction as class A 
misdemeanor burglary, not as class A misdemeanor criminal 
trespass.4 
Based on the above, the trial court correctly concluded that 
defendant's prior conviction for burglary constituted a crime of 
violence, and that defendant was therefore a restricted person in 
possession of a firearm. 
POINT III 
EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED MARIJUANA IN STREET-
SALE-SIZED PACKAGES, AND THAT HE HAD OTHER ITEMS 
COMMONLY USED TO REPACKAGE LARGER QUANTITIES INTO 
STREET-SALE QUANTITIES SUPPORTED THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THAT DEFENDANT POSSESSED MARIJUANA WITH INTENT 
TO DISTRIBUTE IT 
When police officers searched the trailer, they found 
marijuana leaves strewn over the table top (R. 144); a set of 
finger scales capable of weighing up to three ounces (R. 186); 
plastic sandwich bags (R. 144-45); an empty box of plastic 
sandwich bags (R. 158); five one-gallon plastic bags containing 
4
 Defendant's argument also collapses under its own weight: 
criminal trespass is a class B or C misdemeanor, depending upon the 
circumstances. The criminal trespass statute does not define a 
class A misdemeanor criminal trespass. 
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residue that looked and smelled like marijuana (R. 153-54, 166, 
171); two small sandwich bags, each containing an eighth of an 
ounce of marijuana, and four small sandwich bags, each containing 
a quarter of an ounce; and a mobile phone (R. 11). 
The officers who testified at trial had substantial law 
enforcement experience with drug trafficking. They testified 
that the one-galIon bags could hold up to one-half of a pound of 
marijuana, that the one-gallon bags found were the kind typically 
used to package one-half pound quantities of marijuana, and that 
suppliers to street dealers typically packaged marijuana in one-
half to one-pound quantities (R. 150, 153-55, 168). They also 
testified that the sandwich bags and the bags that had been in 
the empty box were the kind of sandwich bags street dealers 
typically used to package marijuana for street sale, and that 
street dealers typically repackaged one-half to one-pound 
marijuana packages into one-eighth-ounce packages (R. 134, 168-
69). The officers testified that street dealers commonly used 
finger scales to weigh their product and to measure out the 
quantities of marijuana found in the baggies seized during the 
search (R. 134-35, 146-47, 167-68); one officer testified he had 
seen over one hundred sets of finger scales and that almost every 
dealer had finger scales to weigh his product (R. 146-47). One 
of the officers testified defendant admitted to him that 
defendant had received calls on the mobile phone from people 
inquiring about purchasing marijuana (R. 129-30). Finally, one 
of the officers testified that even the baggies found constituted 
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too large an amount for personal use, and that someone purchasing 
the total amount contained in the baggies would purchase that 
amount in a single package, not individual baggies (R. 152-53). 
Defendant admitted to police officers that he owned the 
baggies containing marijuana (R. 132).5 At trial, defendant 
claimed he purchased the eighth-ounce bags for personal use only, 
but admitted it was unusual to purchase that much marijuana in 
eighth-ounce packages (R. 183-84). Defendant testified that he 
owned the one-gallon bags, and that he placed the one-gallon bags 
where the officers found them (R. 190-91) . Defendant also 
testified that he owned the finger scales, and that he had used 
them to measure his own marijuana (R. 197-98) . 
The trial court found that defendant possessed marijuana 
with the intent to distribute it (R. 87). On appeal, defendant 
claims the record contains insufficient evidence to establish his 
intent to distribute marijuana.6 To succeed on this claim, 
defendant must establish that the clear weight of the evidence 
contradicts the trial court's finding that he intended to 
distribute marijuana, State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-87 
(Utah 1988), and must "'marshal all the evidence supporting the 
challenged findings'" State v. Hurst. 821 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah 
App. 1991). Defendant cannot rely on evidence "favoring his 
5
 At trial, defendant only admitted owning four of the 
baggies (R. 183-84). 
6
 Defendant does not claim he did not possess marijuana and 
admitted at trial that the four eighth-ounce baggies belonged to 
him (R. 183-84) . 
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innocence and ignoring the conflicting [evidence] against him." 
State v. Bingham, 732 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant has not marshalled the evidence. Instead, 
defendant details the evidence supporting his claim of innocence, 
while minimizing the evidence the State produced to establish 
defendant intended to distribute marijuana. See Appellant's 
Brief at 25-27. In his two-page evidence summary, defendant 
includes a one-line acknowledgment of the State's evidence: "all 
the State produced was the packaged marijuana, finger scales and 
plastic bags." Id. at 27. This single sentence ignores much of 
the evidence the State produced. 
Moreover, the properly marshalled evidence summarized above 
establishes that defendant possessed marijuana with the intent to 
distribute it. For obvious reasons, the trier of fact must 
typically infer an intent to distribute from circumstantial 
evidence such as the presence of equipment used to package 
controlled substances for sale and the possession of quantities 
larger than the quantities typically purchased for personal use. 
See, e.g.. State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1985); 
State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985); State v. Fox. 709 
P.2d 316, 320 (Utah 1985); State v. Phelps, 782 P.2d 196, 197-98 
(Utah App. 1989). Viewed as a whole, the evidence in this case 
shows that defendant acquired five one-half pound bags of 
marijuana; that, while sitting at the table in the trailer, he 
repackaged the 2.5 pounds of marijuana into sandwich bags 
containing one quarter or one eighth ounces for sale on the 
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street; that he used his finger scales to measure this amount 
out; and that he had already disposed of all but six of the 
packages. Although defendant offered alternative explanations 
for the State's evidence, he provided only individual 
explanations for each piece of evidence; his explanations failed 
to rebut the integrated picture painted by the totality of the 
evidence. Therefore, the trial court's conclusion that defendant 
intended to distribute marijuana is not against the clear weight 
of the evidence.7 
Based on the above, the defendant has failed to establish 
that the clear weight of the evidence contradicts the trial 
court's conclusion that he possessed marijuana with the intent to 
distribute it. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
7
 Defendant argues primarily that police officers did not 
catch him with a sufficient quantity from which the trial court 
could infer an intent to distribute. Although several cases rely 
on possession of a quantity larger than necessary for personal use 
as one indicium of intent to distribute, none require it to support 
a conviction. See, e.g. . State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 320 (Utah 
1985) (relying on quantity to establish intent to distribute); 
State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d 182, 183 (Utah 1985) (relying on quantity 
plus the presence of equipment to establish intent to distribute); 
State v. Phelps, 782 P.2d at 198 (large quantity and equipment to 
process marijuana sufficient to support intent to distribute). The 
evidence that defendant possessed materials suggesting he had 
repackaged larger quantities of marijuana into smaller, street-sale 
quantities established that defendant possessed marijuana with the 
intent to distribute it, regardless of the amount the officers 
actually found. 
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ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
The briefs adequately set forth the facts and legal 
standards to resolve this appeal. Oral argument would be of 
little benefit to the court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IZ^ day of rfprl I , 
1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
A t t o r n e y General 
& ^yus~J&>~^ 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE was mailed by first-class mail, 
postage pre-paid, to the following on this /2^day of /4frr4/ 
1995: 
Michael J. Petro 
Young & Kessler 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 58-37a-5 
(c) Carburetion tubes and devices; 
(d) Smoking and carburetion masks; 
(e) Roach clips: meaning objects used to hold burning material, 
such as a marihuana cigarette, that has become too small or too 
short to be held in the hand; 
(f) Miniature cocaine spoons and cocaine vials; 
(g) Chamber pipes; 
(h) Carburetor pipes; 
(i) Electric pipes; 
(j) Air-driven pipes; 
(k) Chillums; 
(1) Bongs; and 
(m) Ice pipes or chillers. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, S 3. 
58-37a-4. Considerations in determining whether object 
is drug paraphernalia* 
In determining whether an object is drug paraphernalia, the trier of fact, in 
addition to all other logically relevant factors, should consider: 
(1) statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the object 
concerning its use; 
(2) prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in control of the 
object, under any state or federal law relating to a controlled substance; 
(3) the proximity of the object, in time and space, to a direct violation of 
this chapter; 
(4) the proximity of the object to a controlled substance; 
(5) the existence of any residue of a controlled substance on the object; 
(6) instructions whether oral or written, provided with the object 
concerning its use; 
(7) descriptive materials accompanying the object which explain or 
depict its use; 
(8) national and local advertising concerning its use; 
(9) the manner in which the object is displayed for sale; 
(10) whether the owner or anyone in control of the object is a legitimate 
supplier of like or related items to the community, such as a licensed 
distributor or dealer of tobacco products; 
(11) direct or circumstantial evidence of the ratio of sales of the object to 
the total sales of the business enterprise; 
(12) the existence and scope of legitimate uses of the object in the 
community; and 
(13) expert testimony concerning its use. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, § 4. 
Cross-References. — Expert witnesses, 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 et seq. 
58-37a-5. Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
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compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 
store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the 
drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, 
pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise 
introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. 
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the 
person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, 
magazine, handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the 
purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any 
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, 8 5. Cross-References. — Sentencing for felo-
Meaning of "this act.* — The term "this nies, }§ 76-3-201, 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
act" means Laws 1981, ch. 76, §§ 1 to 6, which Sentencing for misdemeanors, §§ 76-3-201, 
enacted §§ 58-37a-l to 58-37a-6. 76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS subsequent criminal prosecution of the seller, it 
was factually and legally impossible for the 
J P ^ k defendant to have known that items sold would 
Cited. be used for illegal purposes. State v. Murphy, 
I n t e n t 674 P.2d 1220 (Utah 1983). 
Where the buyer of drug paraphernalia only Cited in State v. Keitz, 856 R2d 685 (Utah 
intended to use the items as evidence in a Ct App. 1993). 
58-37a-6. Seizure — Forfeiture — Property rights. 
Drug paraphernalia is subject to seizure and forfeiture and no property right 
can exist in it. 
History: L. 1981, ch. 76, S 6. Severability Clauses. — Section 7 of Laws 
Compiler's Notes. — This section was de- 1981, ch. 76 provided: "If any provision of this 
clared unconstitutional as violating procedural act or the application thereof to any person or 
due process because it fails to provide for a due circumstance is held invalid, the invalidity does 
process hearing in connection with forfeitures, not affect other provisions or applications of the 
The section is severable and does not render the act which can be given effect without the in-
remainder of the Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act valid provision or application, and to this end 
invalid. See Murphy v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 664 the provisions of this act are severable." 
(10th Cir. 1984). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Constitutionality. bearing in connection with forfeitures. Murphy 
This section violates procedural due process v. Matheson, 742 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1984). 
because it fails to provide for a due process 
270 
58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS 
veterinarian may lawfully possess it only in the container in which it was 
delivered to him by the person selling or dispensing it. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, { 7; 1086, ch. 23, Federal Law. — Section 305 of the Federal 
t 5* Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Meaning of "this act" — The term "this Control Act of 1970, referred to in Subsection 
act," in Subsection (1), means Laws 1971, ch. (1), is 21 U.S.C. § 825. 
145, 55 1 to 22, which enacted this chapter. 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (IXa) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction of Subsec-
tion (IXa) is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is 
guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction punishable under this subsection is guilty of a second 
degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable 
under this subsection is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsec-
tion; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any 
building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place 
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons 
unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in 
any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to be present where 
controlled substances are being used or possessed in violation of this 
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chapter and the use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person may not be convicted 
under this subsection if the evidence shows that he did not use the 
substance himself or advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; 
any incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the 
defendant may be admitted to rebut this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an 
altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled sub-
stance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe, administer, or dispense a controlled sub-
stance to a juvenile, without first obtaining the consent required in 
Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing in loco 
parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an emergency; for purposes 
of this subsection, a juvenile means a "child" as defined in Section 
78-3a-2, and "emergency" means any physical condition requiring the 
administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain 
•or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter knowingly and 
intentionally to prescribe or administer dosages of a controlled sub-
stance in excess of medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user; or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or dispense any 
controlled substance to another person knowing that the other person 
is using a false name, address, or other personal information for the 
purpose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a 
second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if the 
amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, is guilty of 
a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted 
resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one 
ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
(c) Apy person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(aXi) while inside 
the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as 
defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in 
Subsection (2Kb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any 
controlled substance by a person previously convicted under Subsection 
(2Kb), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than 
provided in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2XaXi) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(bXi), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B 
misdemeanor. Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction he is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
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(0 Any person convicted of violating Subsections (2)(aXii) through 
(2)(aXvii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person: 
(i) who is subject to this chapter to distribute or dispense a 
controlled substance in violation of this chapter; 
(ii) who is a licensee to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance to another licensee or other authorized person 
not authorized by his license; 
(iii) to omit, remove, alter, or obliterate a symbol required by this 
chapter or by a rule issued under this chapter; 
(iv) to refuse or fail to make, keep, or fiirnish any record, notifica-
tion, order form, statement, invoice, or information required under 
this chapter; or 
(v) to refuse entry into any premises for inspection as authorized by 
this chapter. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3Xa) shall be punished 
by a civil penalty of not more than $5,000. The proceedings are indepen-
dent of, and not in lieu of, criminal proceedings under this chapter or any 
other law of this state. If the violation is prosecuted by information or 
indictment which alleges the violation was committed knowingly or 
intentionally, that person is upon conviction guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a 
controlled substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, 
suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining 
a controlled substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to 
be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veter-
inarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to 
procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe 
or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain 
possession of, or to procure the administration of any controlled 
substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his 
receiving any controlled substance from another source, fraud, forg-
ery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order 
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription 
or written order issued or written under the terms of tins chapter; 
(iv) to furnish false or fraudulent material information in any 
application, report, or other document required to be kept by this 
chapter or to willfully make any false statement in any prescription, 
order, report, or record required by this chapter; or 
(v) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or 
other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, 
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trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or 
any likeness of any of the foregoing upon any drug or container or 
labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (4Xa) is guilty of a 
third degree felony. 
(5) Prohibited acts E — Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be 
unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Parapher-
nalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances 
Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under 
Subsection (5)(b) if the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the 
grounds of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or post-secondaxy 
institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, of other 
structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for 
an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under 
Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center, 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, 
movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included 
in Subsections (5Xa)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) with a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where 
the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this subsection is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for parole 
until the minimum term of imprisonment under this subsection has been 
served. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established 
would have been less than a first degree felony but for this subsection, a 
person convicted under this subsection is guilty of one degree more than 
the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the 
actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at 
the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor 
that the actor mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred 
was not as described in Subsection (5Xa) or was unaware that the location 
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class 
B misdemeanor. 
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense unlawful 
under this chapter is upon conviction guilty of one degree less than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
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(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by 
law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of 
another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of 
another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(9) (a) When it appears to the court at the time of sentencing any person 
convicted under this chapter that the person has previously been convicted 
of an offense under the laws of this state, the United States, or another 
state, which if committed in this state would be an offense within this 
chapter and it appears that probation would not be of benefit to the 
defendant or that probation would be contrary to the interest, welfare, or 
protection of society, the court, notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if 
there is compliance with Subsection (9Xb), impose a minimum term to be 
served by the defendant, of up to *& the maximum sentence imposed by law 
for the offense committed. 
(b) (i) Before any person may be sentenced to a minimum term as 
provided in Subsection (9Xa), the prosecuting attorney, or grand jury 
if an indictment, shall cause to be subscribed upon the complaint, in 
misdemeanor cases, or the information or indictment, in addition to 
the substantive offense charged, a statement setting forth the alleged 
past conviction of the defendant and specifically stating the date and 
place of conviction and the offense of which the defendant was 
convicted. The allegation shall be presented to the defendant at the 
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by leave of court, but in no 
event later than two days prior to the trial of the offense charged or 
the defendant's entering a plea of guilty. At the time of arraignment or 
a later date when granted by the court, the court shall read the 
allegation of the previous conviction to the defendant, provide him or 
his counsel with a copy of it, and explain to the defendant the 
consequences of the allegation under Subsection (9)(a). The allegation 
of the past conviction of the defendant is not admissible in a jury trial, 
except where the admissibility in evidence of a previous conviction is 
otherwise recognized as admissible by law. 
(ii) The court, following conviction of the defendant of the substan-
tive offense charged and prior to imposing sentence, shall inform the 
defendant of its decision to impose a minimum sentence under 
Subsection (9)(a) and inquire as to whether the defendant admits or 
denies the previous conviction. If the defendant denies the previous 
conviction, the court shall afford him an opportunity to present 
evidence showing that the allegation of the past conviction is errone-
ous or the conviction was lawfully vacated or the defendant was 
pardoned. The evidence shall be made a matter of record. Following 
the evidence, the court shall make a finding as to whether the 
defendant has a previous conviction, which finding is final, except for 
a showing of abuse of discretion. Following the findings by the court, 
the defendant shall be sentenced under Subsection (9)(a) or under the 
appropriate penalty provided by law, as the court in its discretion 
determines. 
(c) Any person sentenced on a second offense to probation who violates 
that probation is subject to Subsections (9Xa) and (9Xb). 
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(d) Nothing in this section in any way limits or restricts Sections 
76-8-1001 and 76-8-1002. 
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof 
which shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distrib-
uted, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence 
that the person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the 
substance or substances. 
(11) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the 
course of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the sub-
stances to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and 
supervision. 
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance 
for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practi-
tioner in the ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate 
scope of his employment. 
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to 
any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter 
shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, § 8; 1072, ch. 22, 
i 1; 1977, ch. 29, ft 6; 1979, ch. 12, § 5; 1985, 
ch. 146, S 1; 1986, ch. 196, ft 1; 1987, ch. 92, 
ft 100; 1987, ch. 190, $ 3; 1988, ch. 95, S 1; 
1989, ch. 50, § 2; 1989, ch. 56, § 1; 1989, ch. 
178, S 1; 1989, ch. 187, ft 2; 1989, ch. 201, § 1; 
1990, ch. 161, S 1; 1990, ch. 163, ft 2; 1990, 
ch. 163, ft 3; 1991, ch. 80, ft 1; 1991, ch. 198, 
ft 4; 1991, ch. 268, 9 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment by ch. 161, effective April 23, 1990, in-
serted "to obtain a prescription for" and "or 
failure by the person to disclose his receiving 
any controlled substance from another source* 
in Subsection (4XaXii) and corrected two refer-
ence errors in Subsection (13). 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, ft 2, effec-
tive from April 23, 1990 until July 1, 1990, 
corrected reference errors in Subsections (9Xa) 
and (13Xb). / 
The 1990 amendment by ch. 163, ft 3, effec-
tive July 1, 1990, substituted "Section 77-18-1* 
for "Rule 20, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure" 
in Subsection (9Xa). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 80, effective 
April 29, 1991, in Subsection (5Xa), inserted 
Subsection (ii), redesignated former Subsection 
(ii) as (iii), substituted "or institution under 
Subsections (5XaXi) and (ii)" for "under Subsec-
tion (5XaXiF in Subsection (iii), inserted Sub-
sections (iv) through (viii), redesignated former 
Subsections (iii) and (iv) as (ix) and (x), and 
substituted "Subsections (5XaXi) through (vuT 
for "Subsection (5XaXi) or (ii)" in Subsection 
(ix); substituted "Chapter 37a, Title 58, Utah 
Drug Paraphernalia Act or Chapter 37b, Title 
58, Imitation Controlled Substances Act" for 
"Chapters 37a or 37b, Title 58" in Subsection 
(13Xa); and added Subsection (14) (appearing 
as Subsection (13) after January 1,1992). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 198, effective 
April 29, 1991, substituted all of the present 
language after "Schedules II through V" in 
Subsection (lXaXiii) for "under an order or 
prescription," and made stylistic changes in the 
introductory paragraph of Subsection (5Xa). 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 268, effective 
January 1, 1992, deleted former Subsection 
(13), imposing a fee of $150 against each person 
convicted of, and each juvenile found within the 
court's jurisdiction because of, committing an 
offense and providing for the use of funds 
generated by the fee. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Cross-References* — Cities and towns, pro-
hibitions of sales of narcotics to minors, ft 10-
8-47. 
Psychotoxic chemical solvent!, penalties for 
use or sale, ft 76-10-101 et seq. 
Sentencing for felonies, ftft 76-3-201, 76-3-
203, 76-3-301. 
Sentencing for misdemeanors, (ft 76-3-201, 
76-3-204, 76-3-301. 
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PART 1 
CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES 
76-3-101. Sentencing in accordance with chapter. 
(1) A person adjudged guilty of an offense under this code shall be sen-
tenced in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. 
(2) Penal laws enacted after the effective date of this code shall be classified 
for sentencing purposes in accordance with this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-101, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, i 76-3-101. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-102, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-102. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law f f 28-30. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, 8 76-3-103. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal 
Law {29. 
Compiler's Notes. — The effective date of 
this code was July 1, 1973. 
C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 9. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 27. 
CJJS. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law §§ 10,12. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 27. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal C.J.S. — 24 CJ.S. Criminal Law § 1461. 
Law § 525. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 1206(3). 
76-3*102. Designation of offenses. 
Offenses are designated as felonies, misdemeanors, or infractions. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
76-3-103. Felonies classified. 
(1) Felonies are classified into four categories: 
(a) Capital felonies; 
(b) Felonies of the first degree; 
(c) Felonies of the second degree; 
(d) Felonies of the third degree. 
(2) An offense designated as a felony either in this code or in another law, 
without specification as to punishment or category, is a felony of the third 
degree. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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76-3-104. Misdemeanors classified. 
(1) Misdemeanors are classified into three categories: 
(a) Class A misdemeanors; 
(b) Class B misdemeanors; 
(c) Class C misdemeanors. 
(2) An offense designated a misdemeanor, either in this code or in another 
law, without specification as to punishment or category, is a class B misde-
meanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-104, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-3-104. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060 
CD. Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal C.J.S. — 22 CJ.S. Criminal Law I 11. 
Law { 30. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law •= 27. 
76-3-105. Infractions. 
(1) Infractions are not classified. 
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly desig-
nated and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a 
felony or misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-105, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-105. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Cooper v. Utah, 684 F. Supp. 1060 
(D. Utah 1987). 
PART 2 
SENTENCING 
76-3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions — 
Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with manda-
tory sentences — Resentencing. 
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal C.J.S. — 24 CJ.S. Criminal Law §§ 1522, 
Law § 552. 1523. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 1210. 
76-3-402. Conviction of lower category of offense. 
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the of-
fense of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and charac-
ter of the defendant, concludes that-it would be unduly harsh to record the 
conviction as being for that category of offense established by statute and to 
sentence the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, 
the court may, unless otherwise specifically provided by law, enter a judgment 
of conviction for the next lower category of offense and impose sentence ac-
cordingly. 
(2) Whenever a conviction is for a felony, the conviction shall be deemed to 
be a misdemeanor if: 
(a) The judge designates the sentence to be for a misdemeanor and the 
sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a misdemeanor; 
or 
(b) The imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is placed 
on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of probation or not, 
and he is thereafter discharged without violating his probation. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude any person from 
obtaining or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-402, enacted by L. sealing of records, § 77-18-2; Rule 4-207, Rules 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-402; 1983, ch. 88, § 6. of Judicial Administration. 
Cross-References. — Expungement and 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «» 1208(2). 
76-3-403. Credit for good behavior against sentence for 
misdemeanor. 
In any commitment to imprisonment for a misdemeanor offense the custo-
dial authority may in its discretion and upon good behavior of the inmate 
allow up to ten days' credit against the sentence to be served for every 30 days 
served or up to two days' credit for every ten days served when the period to be 
served is less than 30 days. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-403, enacted by L. low up to ten days' credit" for "allow five days' 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-403; 1989, ch. 55, i 1. credit," inserted "up to" preceding "two days' 
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend- credit," and made stylistic changes, 
ment, effective April 24,1989, substituted "al-
69 
76-10-308 CRIMINAL CODE 
History: C. 1953,76-10-307, enacted by L. sive, chemical, or incendiary device, knowing it 
1973, ch. 196, ft 76-10-307; 1993, ch, 75, ft 2. to be the device* for "infernal machine, knowing 
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend- it to be such" and made stylistic changes, 
ment, effective May 3,1993, substituted "explo-
76-10-308. Explosive, chemical, or incendiary device — 
Venue of prosecution for shipping. 
Any person who knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly delivers any explo-
sive, chemical, or incendiary device to any person for transmission without the 
consent or direction of the lawful possessor may be prosecuted in the county in 
which he delivers it or in the county to which it is transmitted. 
H i s t o r i c . 1953,76-10-308, enacted by L. enacted by Laws 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-308, 
1993, ch. 75, £ 3. making construction or possession of an infer-
Repeals and Reenactmenta. — Laws nal machine a third-degree felony, and enacts 
1993, ch. 75, { 3 repeals former § 76-10-308, as the present section, effective May 3,1993. 
76-10-309. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1993, ch. 75, § 4 repeals tion for shipping an infernal machine, effective 
i 76-10-309, as enacted by Laws 1973, ch 196, May 3, 1993. For present comparable provi-
5 76-10-309, specifying the venue of prosecu- sions, see { 76-10-308. 
PART 4 
FENCES 
76-10-401. Fencing of shafts and wells. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A X J t — Validity of statutes requiring the 
construction of fences — modern cases, 87 
AJLJUth 1129. 
PARTS 
WEAPONS 
76-10-501. Uniform law — Definitions. 
(1) (a) The individual right to keep and bear arms being a constitutionally 
protected right, the Legislature finds the need to provide uniform laws 
throughout the state. 
(b) This part is uniformly applicable throughout this state and in all its 
political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority may not enforce 
any rule in conflict with this part and there is a moratorium prohibiting 
local authorities from enacting or enforcing any new ordinance, regula-
tion, or rule pertaining to firearms until May 1, 1995, unless hereafter 
authorized by the Legislature by statute. 
(2) As used in this part: 
(a) "Crime of violence*9 means aggravated murder, murder, manslaugh-
ter, rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary, housebreaking, eztor-
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tion, or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence, assault with a 
dangerous weapon, assault with intent to commit any offense punishable 
by imprisonment for more than one year, arson punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year, or an attempt to commit any of these 
offenses. 
(b) "Criminal history background check" means a criminal background 
check conducted by a licensed firearms dealer on every purchaser of a 
handgun through the division or the local law enforcement agency where 
the firearms dealer conducts business. 
(c) "Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use or 
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The 
following factors shall be used in determining whether an item, object, or 
thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; and 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used. 
(d) T)ealerw means every person who is licensed under crimes and 
criminal procedure, 18 U.S.C. 923 and engaged in the business of selling, 
leasing, or otherwise transferring a handgun, whether the person is a 
retail or wholesale dealer, pawnbroker, or otherwise. 
(e) "Division* means the Law Enforcement and Technical Services 
Division of the Department of Public Safety, created in Section 53-5-103. 
(f) "Firearm* means a pistol, revolver, shotgun, sawed-off shotgun, rifle 
or sawed-off rifle, or any device that could be used as a dangerous weapon 
from which is expelled a projectile by any force. 
(g) "Firearms transaction record form* means a form created by the 
division to be completed by a person purchasing, selling, or transferring a 
handgun from a dealer in the state. 
(h) "Handgun* means a firearm which has a short stock and is designed 
to be held and fired by the use of a single hand. 
(i) "Prohibited area* means any place where it is unlawful to discharge 
a firearm. 
(j) "Sawed-off shotgun* or "sawed-off rifle* means a shotgun having a 
barrel or barrels of fewer than 18 inches in length, or in the case of a rifle, 
having a barrel or barrels of fewer than 16 inches in length, or any 
dangerous weapon made from a rifle or shotgun by alteration, modifica-
tion, or otherwise, if the weapon as modified has an overall length of fewer 
than 26 inches. 
History. C. 1953,76-10-501, enacted by L. and (c) as present Subsections (2Xa) and (b); 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-501; 1974, ch. 32, S 27; added designations (bXi), (bXii), and (bXiii) to 
1985, ch. 35, S 1; 1991, ch. 10, ft 11; 1993, ch. Subsection (2); added present Subsection (2Xc); 
234, ft 381; 1994, ch. 19, ft 1; 1994, ch. 151, rewrote Subsection (2Xd); substituted "firearm" 
§ 1. for "weapon" in Subsection (2Xe); inserted "or 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- 'sawed-off rifle'" and "dangerous" in Subsection 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, rearranged the (2Xf); and made stylistic changes throughout 
definitions in Subsection (2) so as to place them the section. 
in alphabetical order and in Subsection (2Xb) The 1994 amendment by ch. 19, effective 
substituted "aggravated murder, murder, man- February 28, 1994, added Subsections (2Xb), 
slaughter" for "murder, voluntary manslaugh- (d), (g), and (h), renumbering the remaining 
ter." subsections accordingly. 
The 1993 amendment, effective July 1,1993, The 1994 amendment by ch. 151, effective 
deleted former Subsection (2Xa), defining "Bu- March 17,1994, substituted "enforce" for "enact 
reau"; redesignated former Subsections (2Xb) or enforce" in the second sentence in Subsection 
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(lXb) and added the second clause in that 
sentence, imposing a moratorium on local reg-
ulation of firearms. 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Weapons Task Force. — Laws 1994, ^ ch. 
151, {{ 2 to 7 create the Weapons Task Force, 
to consist of legislators and citizens represent-
ing various specified interests, to study "which 
weapons laws should be under local control or 
state control; and any conflicts in state, local, 
and federal weapons laws." The task force is to 
report to the Judiciary Interim Committee by 
December 1994 and is repealed December 31, 
1994. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Constitutionality. 
•Dangerous weapon." 
Constitutionality. 
This section provided defendant adequate 
notice that his knives and blowgun were "dan-
gerous weapons," and was therefore not uncon-
stitutionally vague as applied to him. State v. 
Archambeau, 820 R2d 920 (Utah Ct App. 
1991). 
"Dangerous weapon." 
Defendant's two 10-inch knives with 5- and 
6-inch blades and his 48-inch blowgun were 
"dangerous weapons" within the meaning of the 
statute. State v. Archambeau, 820 R2d 920 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A L E — Fact that gun was broken, disman-
tled, or inoperable as affecting criminal respon-
sibility under weapons statute, 81 A.L.R.4th 
746. 
76-10-502. When weapon deemed loaded. 
(1) For the purpose of this chapter, any pistol, revolver, shotgun, rifle, or 
other weapon described in this part shall be deemed to be loaded when there 
is an unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile in the firing position. 
(2) Pistols and revolvers shall also be deemed to be loaded when an 
unexpended cartridge, shell, or projectile is in a position whereby the manual 
operation of any mechanism once would cause the unexpended cartridge, shell, 
or projectile to be fired. 
(3) A muzzle loading firearm shall be deemed to be loaded when it is capped 
or primed and has a powder charge and ball or shot in the barrel or cylinders. 
History: C. 1953, 79-100-502, enacted by 
L. 197S, ch. 196, ft 76-10-502; 1974, ch, 82, 
{ 28; 1990, ch. 328, ft 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted the 
subsection designations (1) to (3); substituted 
"chapter" for "section" in Subsection (1); and 
made stylistic changes throughout 
76-10-503. Purchase or possession of dangerous weapon/ 
handgun — Persons not permitted to have — 
Penalties. 
(1) (a) Any person who has been convicted of any crime of violence under 
the laws of the United States, this state, or any other state, government, 
or country, or who is addicted to the use of any narcotic drug, or who has 
been declared mentally incompetent may not own or have in his posses-
sion or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as defined in 
this part. 
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(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm or sawed-off 
shotgun, he is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(2) (a) Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have 
in his possession or under his custody or control any dangerous weapon as 
defined in this part. 
(b) Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a third degree 
felony, but if the dangerous weapon is a firearm, explosive, or incendiary 
device he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
(3) (a) A person may not purchase, possess, or transfer any handgun 
described in this part who: 
(i) has been convicted of any felony offense under the laws of the 
United States, this state, or any other state; 
(ii) is under indictment; 
(iii) is an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in 
Section 58-37-2; 
(iv) is a drug dependent person as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(v) has been abjudicated as mentally defective, as provided in the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 
Stat. 1536 (1993), or has been committed to a mental institution; 
(vi) is an alien who is illegally or unlawfully in the United States; 
(vii) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonor-
able conditions; or 
(viii) is a person who, having been a citizen of the United States, 
has renounced such citizenship, 
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (3) is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
History: C. 1953,76-10-503, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, S 76-10-503; 1977, ch. 82, § 1; 
1986, ch. 210, § 1; 1990, ch. 160, 8 1; 1991, 
eh. 17,8 l;1991,ch.87,8 5; 1993, ch. 62,8 2; 
1994, ch. 19, 8 2; 1994, ch. 149, 8 2. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, deleted "or a 
lawfully admitted alien who has obtained a 
special hunting permit from the Department of 
Public Safety" before "or any person" in the first 
sentence in Subsection (lXa), inserted "or pro-
bation" and substituted "in a correctional facil-
ity" for "at the Utah state prison or other like 
facility* in Subsection (2Xa), substituted "but" 
for "and" in Subsection (2Xb), and made minor 
stylistic changes. 
The 1991 amendments, both effective April 
29,1991, made identical changes: in Subsection 
(lXa), deleted "who is not either a citizen of the 
United States or a lawfully admitted alien 
whose business, occupation, or duties require 
the use of a dangerous weapon; or any person" 
following "person" and deleted the former sec-
ond sentence, which read "The Department of 
Public Safety shall adopt rules governing the 
issuance and use of special hunting permits for 
lawfully admitted aliens." 
The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993, 
deleted "or is incarcerated in a correctional 
facility" after "felony" in Subsection (2Xa). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 19, effective 
February 28,1994, added Subsection (3). 
The 1994 amendment by ch. 149, effective 
May 2, 1994, substituted "this state" for "the 
state" in Subsection (lXa), "this subsection" for 
"this section" in Subsections (lXb) and (2Xb), 
and "incendiary device" for "infernal machine" 
in Subsection (2Xb). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
Federal Law. — The Brady Handgun Vio-
lence Prevention Act, cited in Subsection 
(3XaXv), is codified mainly as 18 U.S.C. 8 921 
etseq. 
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tion, because jurisdiction attached under the Certiorari 
statute in effect when the petition for review When exercising certiorari jurisdiction 
was filed. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n granted by this section, the Supreme Court 
v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
1&93). not of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the 
—Formal adjudicative proceedings. P*1"*68 » h o u l d •ddr*»« ** decision of the Court 
Subdivision OXeXiii) confers jurisdiction in * A*?*ii*» ***? **f^£l!*„f^ *££ 
the Supreme Court only over final orders and Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & v u l a n l**lh 
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992). 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and 
to issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of 
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public 
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, Board of State Lands, Board 
of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of 
the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from the small claims 
department of a circuit court; 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by 
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, 
except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence 
for a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs chal-
lenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases 
involving a first degree or capital felony; 
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(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, in-
cluding, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child 
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
0') appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four 
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate 
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-S, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, i 46; 1987, ch. 161,1 804; 1988, 
ch, 73, t 1; 1988, ch. 210, t 141; 1988, ch. 
948,1 8; 1990, ch, 80,1 6; 1990, ch. 224, § 8; 
1991, ch, 268, S 22; 1992, ch, 127, t 12; 1994, 
ch, IS, 5 45. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
ment, effective April 27, 1992, added Subsec-
tion (2Xh) and redesignated former Subsections 
(2Xh) through (j) as Subsections (2Xi) through 
(k). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2,1994, 
substituted 'Board of Pardons and Parole" for 
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2Xh) and 
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in 
Subsection (4). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Scope. 
Cited 
Habeas corpus proceedings. 
Appeal from the dismissal of a habeas corpus 
petition, in which defendant claimed only that 
his due process rights were violated at a hear-
ing before the parole board, lay to the Court of 
Appeals rather than the Supreme Court; the 
latter has jurisdiction only over direct appeals 
of first degree or capital felony convictions and 
appeals in habeas corpus cases where the con-
viction or sentence is challenged. Padilla v. 
Utah Bd of Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991). 
Scope. 
This statute does not authorize the Court of 
Appeals to review the orders of every adminis-
trative agency, but allows judicial review of 
agency decisions "when the legislature ex-
pressly authorizes a right of review." Barney v. 
Division of Occupational and Professional l i -
censing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct App.), cert 
denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
Cited in State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 
(Utah 1991). 
CHAPTERS 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-4. 
78-3-11.5. 
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases 
to circuit court — Appeals — 
Jurisdiction when circuit and 
district court merged. 
State District Court Adminis-
trative System. 
Section 
78-3-16.5. 
78-3-21. 
78-3-21.5. 
Repealed. 
Judicial Council — Creation — 
Members — Terms and elec-
tion — Responsibilities — Re-
ports. 
Data bases for judicial boards. 
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KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
JAMES R. TAYLOR #3199 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801) 370-8026 
IN TEE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, t CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. t 
KEVIN W. GURR, t Case No. 941400013 FS 
Defendant(s). : Judge Ray M. Harding 
This matter came before the Court, the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding presiding on the 26th day of April, 1994. The Plaintiff 
was represented by Deputy Utah County Attorney James R. Taylor. 
The Defendant was present in person and represented by Attorney 
Michael Petro. The court heard the evidence of the parties and has 
issued a written ruling. Being fully advised in the premises, the 
Court determines that the following have been established beyond a 
reasonable doubt: 
FINDINGS OP PACT 
1. The Defendant, Kevin W. Gurr, was convicted of burglary, 
CR 86 144 in the Fourth District Court on May 2, 1986. 
2. On October 20, 1993, the Defendant was present in a 
house/camp trailer occupied by him when officers of the Narcotics 
Task Force executed a warrant authorizing a search of the trailer. 
3. The trailer was within 1,000 feet of the grounds of a 
fourth Judicial District Court o* 
Utah County, Siatt of utUi 
-i-Sbi Deputy 
89 
church but not within 1,000 feet of the church itself. 
4. No one else resided in the trailer at the time of the 
execution of the search warrant. 
5. Personal property including possessions and clothing of 
the defendant were located in the trailer. 
6. The trailer was quite small, approximately 10 feet wide by 
12 or 14 feet long. 
7. Officers located 8 separate baggies containing 1/8 ounce 
and 1/4 ounce quantities of marijuana in the trailer in the general 
vicinity of the built-in table on one end of the trailer. 
8. Officers also located a set of "finger scales", capable of 
measuring small amounts or quantities. 
9. Near the table officers located a number of larger sized 
bags containing marijuana residue. Officers testified that the 
bags were of the type typically used to package larger amounts of 
marijuana which would then be broken for sale into smaller 
quantities such as the baggies of marijuana recovered. 
10. A Mossberg 12 gauge shotgun and a Springfield .22 caliber 
rifle were located in a closet inside the trailer. 
11. The evidence adduced at trial indicated that the 
Defendant, while he did not own the firearms, knowingly had 
possession of the weapons. 
12. A motorola mobile phone was found within the trailer. 
13. In response to questions from the officers, the Defendant 
stated that the marijuana had been "fronted" or provided on credit 
2 
and that people had called on the phone to inquire about marijuana. 
14. Officers located several pipes used for the ingestion of 
marijuana. 
From the forgoing findings of fact the Court makes and enters 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1* The Defendant was knowingly and intentionally in 
possession of drug paraphernalia including items used or intended 
for use in the storage or consumption of marijuana. 
2. The Defendant, a restricted person under U.C.A. Section 
76-10-503, 1953 as amended, knowingly and intentionally had 
firearms in his custody or control. 
3. The Defendant had possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute the marijuana. 
4. None of the activities described took place within a drug 
free zone. 
DATED this / G day of &3L-1994. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
MICHAEL J. PETRO 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
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ADDENDUM C 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT W!Uuxt- ™ *' 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN GURR, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER: CR-86-144 
DATE: May 2, 1986 
CULLEN Y. CHRISTENSEN, JUDGE 
Rept.: E.V. Quist, CSR 
JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court for pronouncement of 
Judgment with Kent Barry, Deputy County Attorney, appearing in 
and on behalf of the State of Utah. The defendant was present in 
Court and was represented by Attorney Michael Petro. 
The defendant previously entered a plea of Guilty to a 
charge of Burglary, a Third Degree Felony, at which time the 
matter was referred to the Adult Probation and Parole Department 
for a presentence investigation and report. The report has now 
been completed and submitted to the Court along with the recom-
mendations. 
Mr. Petro addressed the Court in defendant's behalf and 
stated the defendant concurs with the recommendation with the 
exception of the 30 day jail time. Mr. Petro made a Motion to 
sentence defendant under the next lower offense. 
The State objected to defense motion and argued same. 
The defendant addressed the Court in his own behalf. 
The Court granted the defense motion and defendant to 
be sentence under a Class A Misdemeanor due to the circumstances 
surrounding the charge. 
There being no legal reason why Judgment should not be 
pronounced at this time, it is now the Judgment of the Court that 
the defendant be confined in the Utah County Jail for a period of 
one (1) year, pay a fine of $500.00 and restitution as is 
appropriate under direction of the Probation Department. 
Execution on the jail sentence is suspended and defendant placed 
on probation under the following conditions: 
1. Defendant to enter agreement with Adult Probation 
and Parole Department and comply with terms of 
probation. 
2. That he make himself available to the Department 
and the Court when requested to do so. 
3. That he violate no laws of the United States, Utah 
or any municipality wherein he may reside. 
4. Defendant to pay a fine of $500.00 or perform 100 
hours Community Services in lieu of that fine. 
5. That he pay restitution as directed by the Pro-
bation Department. 
6. That he have no contact with the victims during his 
probation period. 
7. Defendant to serve 45 days in the Utah County Jail 
with work release as arranged with the Department. 
The defendant to report to the Utah County Jail no 
latter than 7:00 p.m. Monday, May 5th, 1986. 
The Court to retain jurisdiction in this matter as to 
change this order from time to time when so warranted. 
Dated this day of May, 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
STATEOFUTAH ) 
)SS 
OOUNTYOFUTAH ) 
I, the undersigned, Clerk of the Fourth District Court 
of Utah County, Utah, do hereby certify that tha 
annexed and foregoing is a true and full copy of an 
original document on file in my office as such Cleric 
Witness my hand^nd *e*l of said Court 
dayof 
OARMAB 
</C£nt^ 
TENSEN, JUDGE 
